PUNITIVE DAMAGES
FOR INSURANCE FRAUD
Richard Hayles, Gilbertson Davis Emerson LLP
Yasmin Visram, Corporate Counsel, National Life
From
the Canadian Journal of Insurance Law,
Volume 23, Number 2, March, 2005
In Whiten v. Pilot
Insurance Co.,, an Ontario jury awarded $1 million in punitive
damages against an insurer for breach of the insurer’s
duty of good faith. Although this award was reduced to $100,000
by the Court of Appeal, in the Supreme Court of Canada the original
award of the jury was restored.. The Whiten decision has prompted
a great deal of debate among the insurance bar. On the basis
of Whiten, there is a perception that punitive damages are now
more readily available in bad faith claims, and that future
awards will be substantial.
The impact of Whiten
is still being worked out as the case law on breach of the insurer’s
duty of good faith develops. Given the degree of interest in
the Whiten decision, however, it is curious that a series of
cases in which courts have awarded punitive damages against
fraudulent insurance claimants has received little or no comment.
The cases typically
involve a group of individuals who conspire together to stage
motor vehicle accidents and submit false property damage and
personal injury claims. These schemes are usually well-organized,
and often involve multiple claims on behalf of individual participants.
Punitive damage awards have ranged from $500 against minor players
to as much as $100,000 against “ringleaders.”
As will be seen,
there has been little debate in the courts as to whether punitive
damages are justified in insurance fraud cases. Rather, the
courts have repeatedly emphasized the active role the judiciary
must play in ensuring that individuals who commit insurance
fraud are penalized accordingly.
Despite the clear
support of the courts, it is surprising that more insurers have
not been willing to pursue punitive damages for fraudulent claims.
To date, almost all of the cases involving claims for punitive
damages against fraudulent claimants have been commenced by
the Insurance Corporation of British Columbia. Despite policy
statements that fraud is a serious corporate issue, few insurers
have demonstrated the will to actively pursue fraudulent claimants
in court. This, despite the high cost to the industry of insurance
fraud.
Early
Cases
Sanghera
v. Thindd is the first of the B.C. fraudulent claims
cases. There were two actions before the court. The first was
a tort action in which the plaintiffs claimed against an I.C.B.C.
insured for damages arising out of a motor vehicle accident.
I.C.B.C. defended the tort action by adding itself as a third
party. It also commenced the second action, which was a claim
against the plaintiffs in the first action for fraudulent conspiracy
to obtain insurance benefits. The damages claimed by I.C.B.C.
in the second action included amounts paid to the plaintiffs
for collision damages and medical expenses, I.C.B.C.’s
adjusting and investigation expenses, punitive damages, and
the full legal costs incurred by I.C.B.C. in the two actions.
The legal fees and disbursements constituted the bulk of the
amount claimed in the second action.
The
trial judge concluded that there had not in fact been any accident
and dismissed the first action. Instead of assessing the damages
claimed by I.C.B.C. in the second action, she determined that
an award of solicitor and client costs in both actions would
be sufficient to compensate the Corporation. I.C.B.C. appealed,
and the Court of Appeal held that it was an error on the part
of the trial judge to substitute costs for the damages claimed
in the second action. The appellate court referred the matter
back to the trial judge for an assessment of damages. One of
the issues before the court on the assessment was the question
of punitive damages; Proudfoot, J. emphasized the need to deter
fraud against a public insurance program as the basis for her
awardd.
The
plaintiff also claims exemplary or punitive damages and I
suggest this is a most appropriate case in which to make such
an award. The defendants have committed a fraud on the Insurance
Corporation of British Columbia. They have attempted to extract
sums of money from an insurance program that is in place for
the benefit of all the people of British Columbia. As I said
in my original judgment, “nothing can destroy such a
scheme more easily and more rapidly than abuse of that system,
particularly when it is as artfully attempted as it was in
the case at bar”. Not only must this type of claim be
discouraged but it must be stopped if the system is to survive.
There are five defendants involved in this matter. I think
an appropriate award under this head of damage is $25,000.00.
I.C.B.C. had also raised claims
for the return of benefits paid, adjusting and clerical staff
costs, and legal fees. Proudfoot, J. referred to case law stating
that the measure of damages for the tort of deceit is an award
which puts the plaintiff in the position he would have been
in had the fraudulent representation never been made. She concluded
that all of the losses that directly flow from the fraud are
recoverable, including consequential damages, subject only to
remoteness and the plaintiff’s obligation to mitigate.
Payments made to the claimants
before the fraud was discovered clearly come within the measure
of damages for deceit, and the trial judge granted judgment
for these amounts. An I.C.B.C. employee provided an estimate
of the internal adjusting costs, testifying that the amount
claimed was extremely conservative. This evidence was accepted
by the trial judge, and these costs were added to the judgment.
The trial judge went on to conclude
that since I.C.B.C.’s legal costs had all been incurred
as a consequence of the fraud, the company was entitled to recover
all its costs as damages for deceit. She refused the request
of defendants’ counsel to have the costs referred to the
registrar for assessment:
Counsel for the defendants
confuses costs with damages. This is not a case of having
the legal fees taxed as costs; this is a case of the plaintiff
being returned as near as possible to their [sic] position
prior to this scam or fraudulent scheme. Had no accident been
reported, the plaintiff would not have had to pay out these
moneys?. The plaintiff is entitled to recover all of its losses,
including legal fees paid?. These are damages suffered, they
are not costs.
The decision of the trial judge
was varied in the Court of Appeal. On the punitive damages issue,
the appellate court agreed with the trial judge that the defendants’
fraud was in reality a fraud on the public and therefore deserved
punishment. Southin, J.A. took exception to the amount of punitive
damages awarded, however, saying it was unclear whether the
trial judge had awarded damages solely for the original fraud,
or had also meant to punish the defendants for their false testimony
at trial. Since exemplary damages can’t be awarded for
perjury, and because it would be unfair to punish two defendants
who hadn’t testified at trial, the Court of Appeal reduced
the award under this heading from $25,000 to $15,000.
The Court of Appeal upheld the
damages awarded by the trial judge for benefits paid before
the fraud was uncovered, and for internal claims costs. The
panel disagreed with the award of costs as damages, however,
saying that no action lies for bringing an action that fails,
except in the very narrow circumstance where a malicious abuse
of civil process has resulted in special damage. Even in such
a case, “special damage” does not include the costs
of the prior proceeding, so the court substituted an award of
solicitor and client costs for the award of costs as damages
for deceit.
The issue of punitive damages
for insurance fraud next came before the B.C. courts in I.C.B.C.
v. Sam.. The action was a claim against 18 defendants who were
part of a fraudulent scheme involving 8 car accidents. The plaintiff
obtained default judgment against several defendants, and applied
for an assessment of damages against those defendants only.
Under the B.C. Supreme Court Rules, the defendants in default
were deemed to admit the allegations against them in the statement
of claim; in addition, the plaintiff filed affidavit evidence
detailing the actions of the defaulting defendants. In one group
of accidents, the defendants arranged a collision between a
stolen car and a car registered in the name of one of the defendants.
In a second group of incidents, the defendants alleged their
vehicle was struck by an unidentified vehicle, when in fact
no collision had occurred. The defendants had filed claims for
personal injury and property damage based on the fraudulent
accidents.
The court granted punitive damages
ranging from $3,000 to $11,000, depending on the degree of culpability
of each individual defendant. As in Sanghera, the court emphasized
the fact that the defendants were part of “organized deliberate
schemes to defraud the publicly owned plaintiff” as grounds
for a punitive damages award. The degree of planning involved,
as well as the use of stolen vehicles, were seen as aggravating
factors; in addition, defendants who brought claims with respect
to several accidents were subjected to higher punitive damage
awards than defendants who participated in only one accident.
Although the court adverted
to the principle that the inability of the defendants to pay
could be a mitigating factor, there was no evidence of the defendants’
financial circumstances before the court, so this factor only
meant that the court should be cautious. It was no bar to a
summary assessment of punitive damages.. The court also mentioned
that penalties imposed by the defendants in criminal proceedings
could affect the award of punitive damages; in this case, however,
there were no criminal proceedings.
In addition to punitive damages,
the judgment included benefits paid to the defendants, along
with investigation costs, the latter being established by means
of affidavit evidence detailing the hours expended by I.C.B.C.
employees, along with their hourly pay rates.
I.C.B.C. v. Leee0
involved a much more substantial conspiracy than the previous
cases. The defendant Nguyen was a paralegal employed by a Burnaby
law firm, and also a court interpreter. He used his knowledge
of the legal system to recruit other participants in the scheme,
and to plan the majority of the staged accidents. The Corporation
claimed damages against nearly 60 individuals as a result of
a total of 12 fraudulent accidents. Most of the defendants failed
to enter an appearance or file a statement of defence, and I.C.B.C.
moved to assess damages after obtaining interlocutory judgment
against them.
The court was careful to acknowledge
the difference between punitive damages and compensatory and
aggravated damages, quoting the following passage from Huff
v. Pricee1(in which the B.C. Court of Appeal
refers to the reasons given by McIntyre, J. in the Supreme Court
in Vorvis):
Punitive damages are measured
by the degree of moral culpability of the defendant. They
are not designed to compensate the plaintiff and they are
not measured by an assessment of the plaintiff’s suffering.
An element of willfulness or recklessness such as would underlie
a finding of guilt in a criminal act is likely to be present
before punitive damages will be awarded. But the defendant’s
conduct need not be criminal. Mr. Justice McIntyre used such
words to describe the conduct that would give rise to a claim
for punitive damages as “harsh, vindictive, reprehensible
and malicious,” but Mr. Justice McIntyre acknowledged
that he had not exhausted the available adjectives.
. . .
The award of punitive damages should not try
to do again what has been done by the compensatory damages,
including the aggravated damages. But if some measure of further
punishment is still required then the amount assessed should
be consistent with the concept that it is punishment that
is being imposed and not restitution that is being exacted.
The award should not be inconsistent with the principles that
underlie the imposition of criminal penalties. And, of course,
if a criminal penalty has been imposed then that should be
taken into account.
No criminal penalty had been
imposed against the defendants in I.C.B.C. v. Le. The court
did state, however, that the range of fines that would be imposed
as punishment in a criminal prosecution for the same acts was
a factor to be considered in assessing punitive damages.
The court took note of the fact
that the scheme was well organized, and that specialized knowledge
had been used to recruit participants for profit. The fact that
some of the claimants had involved their children in the staged
accidents, and made claims on behalf of the children, was considered
an aggravating factor. Several defendants had instituted court
actions in pursuit of their fraudulent claims, which the court
described as an abuse of process. Participation in more than
one accident was also considered an aggravating factor.
The court employed a sliding scale to calculate
punitive damages awards in accordance with the degree of culpability
of each individual defendant. A base award of $10,000 was assessed
against every defendant. Defendants who had abused the process
of the court by litigating false claims were to pay an additional
$10,000 each. Those who were involved in multiple claims were
to pay $15,000 in addition to the base amount of $10,000, while
those who were involved in multiple claims and abuse of process
were assessed an additional $20,000 over the base amount.
The highest award was reserved
for the “mastermind” who initiated the scheme:
With regard to?Lin Nguyen,
he was, as I have indicated, the mastermind behind this entire
scheme. He was certainly directly involved in six of the staged
accidents and he was indirectly involved in the other six
accidents, since he was the one that set up the scheme initially.
His actions resulted in a total loss for the six direct or
directed accidents in the sum of $126,402.01. And for all
twelve accidents which he was indirectly or directly involved
as the mastermind of the scheme there was a total loss of
$316,159.74. And the plaintiff is entitled to the amount of
that sum for compensatory damages against Mr. Lin Nguyen.
In addition, there will be an award of punitive damages against
him in the sum of $100,000.
The court also awarded claims
adjustment expenses, and “special costs,” or a full
indemnification of all legal fees.
After the Whiten Decision
Following the Supreme Court
of Canada’s decision in Whiten v. Pilot, I.C.B.C continued
to vigorously pursue punitive damages for insurance fraud. In
the 18 months following the Supreme Court decision, I.C.B.C
successfully sought punitive damages for fraudulent insurance
claims in no less than five separate cases. Collectively, I.C.B.C.
has been awarded more than $600,000 in punitive damages since
the Whiten decision.
In Insurance Corporation of British Columbia
v. Hoang,13 I.C.B.C. sought damages against the 35 defendants
for conspiring to stage various motor vehicle accidents and
making fraudulent personal injury claims. Default judgment was
granted against 14 of the defendants. In this decision, I.C.B.C.
sought an assessment of damages arising out of the default judgments.
I.C.B.C. was awarded damages to compensate the
corporation for monies paid out as a result of the fraudulent
claims as well as the costs incurred in processing, reviewing
and adjudicating the claims. Having found that the defendants
had each committed fraud, the court seemed willing to grant
I.C.B.C. punitive damages. The court noted that the conduct
of the defendants in deliberately participating in a scheme
to defraud the insurer was exactly the type of reprehensible
conduct that called for an award of punitive damages.
However, the fact that fraud had been found was, in itself,
not enough for the court to determine the quantum of damages.
In determining whether punitive damages were appropriate and
if so, determining the quantum of punitive damages, the Court
focused on the conduct of the defendants. The Court decided
that further information regarding the specific conduct of certain
defendants was required. Based on the information before it,
the court was able to decide on the punitive damage award against
four of the defendants. After considering the facts, the court
awarded punitive damages of $1,000 against three of the defendants
individually and an award of $5,000 against the fourth.
Finally, in a further proceeding for judgment
in accordance with the jury verdict,14 the court fixed special
damages and punitive damages against three defendants who had
neither settled with I.C.B.C. nor had their claims resolved
in any other proceedings. The court awarded special damages
against all of the three remaining defendants together with
punitive damages ranging from $7,500 to $15,000. Bennett J also
went on to affirm the punitive damages awarded by the jury against
two other defendants, a father and son. The jury awarded punitive
damages against the son in the amount of $20,000. No punitive
damages were awarded against the father.
In awarding the punitive damages, the court noted that an aggravating
factor was that children had been used in the cars when certain
accidents were staged. The defendant against whom $15,000 was
awarded had used her own children in the accident, which the
court felt had added considerably to the seriousness of her
conduct.
In the next case, the Insurance Corporation of British Columbia
v. Phung,15 I.C.B.C. sought damages against 26 individuals who
had staged five motor vehicle accidents. I.C.B.C. obtained default
judgments, including punitive damages, against many of the defendants.
In awarding punitive damages, the court noted that, as in the
Hoang case, the conduct of the defendants in deliberately participating
in a scheme of fraud against the insurer was just the type of
reprehensible conduct that called for an award of punitive damages.
More significantly, the court also noted that in each case,
a fraud had been effectively committed on the public. The court
accepted evidence from I.C.B.C. that the Corporation spent $10
million a year fighting fraud cases and that its estimated losses
as a result of fraud were in excess of $150 million a year.
The court further accepted I.C.B.C.’s estimate that insurance
fraud resulted in a cost to each policyholder in the order of
$150 per year. Insurance fraud, the court noted, was “a
significant problem for the corporation” and one that
had “a direct and serious effect on the public.”16
Ultimately, the court awarded punitive damages
of $5,000 each against two of the defendants, and $15,000 against
the third defendant. In regards to the fourth defendant, Phung,
the court noted that he was involved in multiple claims and
that his fraud had resulted in a loss to I.C.B.C. of over $44,000.
The court also noted that Phung, like the third defendant, was
a mastermind of the operation, organizing and encouraging other
defendants. Taking into account his role, the court awarded
punitive damages against him in the amount of $25,000.
I.C.B.C. was also successful in obtaining punitive
damages in two other cases: Insurance Corporation of British
Columbia v. Siemens17 in which it was awarded $5,000 in punitive
damages against each of the defendants, and in Insurance Corporation
of British Columbia v. Akers18 in which the punitive damages
awarded ranged from $500 to $5,000. These cases involved legitimate
motor vehicle accidents in which the participants lied to the
police and the insurer regarding the identity of the driver
because the driver was impaired at the time of the accident.
The court indicated that the motive behind the fraud was relevant,
in that a passenger who lied in order to protect someone else
rather than for purposes of personal gain was held to be less
culpable, while individuals who exaggerated their injuries and
pursued court actions in an effort to extract money from an
insurer were subject to higher punitive damages awards.
One of the most significant cases for I.C.B.C.
since the Whiten decision involved the corporation’s suit
against 25 defendants for staged motor vehicle accidents, Insurance
Corporation of British Columbia v. Sun19.
In that case, ten of the defendants were subject to consent
judgments or discontinuances. Of the remaining 15 defendants,
10 were subject to default judgments and the remaining 5 were
found liable by jury. The jury awarded punitive damages against
each of the 5 defendants and also awarded punitive damages against
the 10 defaulted defendants. In its final verdict, the jury
awarded punitive damages against the 15 defendants in amounts
ranging from $20,000 to $75,000.
Judgement was granted to I.C.B.C. in accordance
with the jury award and, ultimately, I.C.B.C.’s collective
award for punitive damages against the 15 defendants amounted
to $410,000.
What is striking about the Sun decision, apart from the overall
size of the award, is the fact that the jury awarded significant
punitive damages against defendants who had caused nominal losses
to I.C.B.C. In the example of one defendant, where I.C.B.C.’s
cost of adjudicating the fraudulent claim was assessed at $93,
the jury awarded $20,000 in punitive damages. The court appeared
to consider the discrepancy between the punitive damages and
the actual loss to I.C.B.C but ultimately upheld the jury’s
decision. In so doing, the court noted that the jury had awarded
similar amounts against other defendants who had played small
roles in the fraudulent scheme.
Other Jurisdictions
It appears that insurers other
than I.C.B.C have rarely chosen to pursue punitive damages against
fraudulent claimants, and as a result there are few reported
decision son this issue outside British Columbia.
Two Alberta cases involving automobile insurance
fraud are the exception20. Both cases involved the same insurer.
In Al Asadi v. Alberta Motor Association Insurance Company,21
the plaintiff alleged that his car had been stolen. He then
sued the insurer for its replacement value as well as for aggravated
and punitive damages. The Court dismissed his claims, finding
instead that the theft had not occurred and that he had willfully
filed a false proof of claim. The court awarded $5000 in punitive
damages against the plaintiff and in so doing, highlighted the
judiciary’s role in penalizing those who engage in insurance
fraud22:
The courts must play their part in penalizing
those insured who engage in insurance fraud in appropriate
cases, as equally as they must punish insurers who fail to
deal with the claims advanced by an insured in good faith.
This is one of those appropriate cases.
In Haiduc v. Alberta Motor Association
Insurance Company,23the court again emphasized the
active role the judiciary must play in penalizing those who
commit insurance fraud. The plaintiff filed an auto theft claim
in which he misrepresented the purchase price of the car as
well as its accident and repair history. In addition, he submitted
a fictitious bill of sale. The court awarded $1000 in punitive
damages against the plaintiff and noted the following24:
The plaintiff did not appreciate
the high standard of candor and honesty required of him in
dealing with his insurer. In fact, the plaintiff displayed
a sense that what was going on between himself and the insurer
was a game in which, if he won, he would get paid, and if
he lost, he wouldn’t. It appeared that he saw the insurer
as an adversary and that if he could get paid when he shouldn’t,
or be paid more than he should have been paid, he would simply
be “winning” and outsmarting his opponent.
Counsel for the defendant suggested that there
was a crisis in the insurance industry due to the prevalence
of fraudulent and exaggerated claims resulting in escalating
insurance premiums which must be bourne by the insuring public.
The defendant seeks punitive damages as an example, a message
to others, a deterrent to discourage fraudulent claims. This
is, in my view, a rational and appropriate use of punitive
damages.
Beyond Motor Vehicle
Fraud: Disability Claims
The court in both the Al-Asadi and the Haiduc decisions
followed the decision in Andrusiw v. Aetna Life Insurance Company
of Canada,25 the first reported case in which punitive damages
were awarded for a fraudulent disability insurance claim.
The plaintiff was the president and owner of a manufacturing
and distribution company. Following a stroke, Aetna approved
a disability claim based on the medical reports of the plaintiff’s
treating physician. At one point Aetna even entered into negotiations
for a lump sum settlement of the entire disability claim.
After years of making payments, Aetna received a tip that the
plaintiff was working. As a result, Aetna commenced an investigation
into the plaintiff’s activities and requested that the
plaintiff complete a statement outlining his daily activities
and abilities.
In that statement, the plaintiff indicated that he would go
in to work once in a while but was unable to perform most of
his duties. By contrast, the evidence gathered by Aetna showed
that, within two years of the stroke, the plaintiff had begun
working full-time hours. While the plaintiff argued that 80%
of his time at work was spent reading magazines, Aetna’s
evidence showed that the plaintiff was in fact running the company,
signing cheques and making key decisions. The evidence at trial
also demonstrated that for many years following his stroke,
the plaintiff had structured payments out of the company so
that he would receive no salary.
At trial, the court found that the plaintiff had been able
to perform his own occupation within a year of the stroke. The
Court further found that the plaintiff had willfully hid this
information from Aetna and had knowingly misrepresented his
true abilities to both Aetna and his own doctors.
The court also rejected the plaintiff’s argument that
he had a valid claim under an alternative provision of the policy
which provided for payments based on an “assumed total
disability.” In so doing, the court noted that whether
or not the plaintiff had a valid claim under the assumed total
disability definition of the policy did not change the fact
that he had chosen to make false statements in the claim actually
submitted. Willfully making those false statements, the court
noted, vitiated his entire claim.
The court ultimately held that the contract
of insurance had terminated as of the date the plaintiff’s
misrepresentations first began. The court ordered the defendant
to repay in excess of $250,000 in disability payments that had
been made to him by Aetna.
In then considering Aetna’s
claim for punitive damages, the court noted the following26:
The contract of insurance
between an insurer and an insured is one of utmost good faith.
Implicit is a term of the contract that the insurer has an
obligation to deal with the claims advanced by an insured
in good faith and an insured has an obligation to the insurer
to put forward his claims honestly and in good faith. As such,
breach of that obligation on the part of either party constitutes
a separate and independent wrong for which compensation is
paid.
Having found that the plaintiff
had breached the implied term of good faith, the court awarded
punitive damages in the amount of $20,000, noting quite clearly
that the obligation to act in good faith is a two-way street27:
A great deal has been made
in the case law, to which this Court was referred, of the
fact that insurers vis à vis their insureds are in
a superior bargaining position and one which places the insureds
in positions of dependency and vulnerability. Equally, insurers
must not be looked upon as fair game. It is a two-way street
founded upon the principle of utmost good faith arising from
the very nature of the contract.
The Court also
noted that if the only consequence of the plaintiff’s
fraudulent claim was that he forfeited that claim, then in effect
he was no worse off than if he had been truthful in the first
place. As such, deterrence, which was one of the objectives
of granting punitive damages, would be given no effect.
Factors Considered in Awarding
Punitive Damages for Insurance Fraud
In Hoang, the court
summarized the factors that are to be considered by the court
in assessing punitive damages28. These factors include:
(1) Whether the claims pertain
to a fraud on the public or are of the public interest such
that they have an effect on that public body and public taxpayers;
(2) Whether the defendants’ conduct
includes criminal conduct. If it does, the amount of the punitive
damage award was to be consistent with the criminal penalty.
The court also noted that if the defendant had been charged
criminally, that fact should be taken into account;
(3) Any aggravating factors that might justify a higher aware
of punitive damages. For example, whether the fraudulent acts
were planned, organized, and deliberate; whether any specialized
knowledge was used to implement the fraud; whether persons
were recruited for profit; whether families and children were
involved; whether the defendants participated in multiple
claims; whether an individual defendant could be described
as the “ringleader” behind a series of claims
advanced by others; whether the defendants abused the court
process by commencing actions based on the fraudulent claims;
and
(4) Any mitigating factors, such as the limited
financial means of the defendant, the fact that the defendant
played a relatively minor role in a larger scheme organized
by others; or the fact that a defendant was motivated by a
desire to protect a friend or relative, rather than by personal
financial gain.
Other cases have also been instructive
on the factors a court will consider when determining the amount
of the punitive damages to award. In Sam,29 the fact that there
had been no submissions made with respect to financial positions
of the defendants did not persuade the Court to “sidestep”
assessing punitive damages entirely. The court will also consider
the number of fraudulent acts committed by the defendants30
and degree of deceit perpetrated by the defendant.31 Courts
have also recognized the rising trend in insurance fraud and
the role of the court in deterring this trend and the important
deterrent role punitive damages can play.32
Conclusion
Although the cases discussed in this article deal primarily
with frauds involving motor vehicle accident claims, fraud is
a serious problem in many other areas of insurance, including
property insurance, disability, and group health benefits. Since
the cost of claims attributable to fraud is reflected in premiums,
the adverse effects of widespread fraud impact not only insurers,
but the public as well, whether the insurer involved is publicly
owned or not.
Insurance provides individuals with a means
of sharing risk among a larger community, and in doing so provides
an important benefit to society as a whole. To the extent that
fraud increases the cost of insurance, it also restricts its
availability, placing the cost of insurance beyond the means
of many people.
Police and prosecutors are often reluctant
to commit scarce resources to the prosecution of insurance fraud
cases, especially when the amount involved in an individual
case is relatively small. Although fraudulent claims often do
involve small amounts of money, the overall number of claims
is large, and the cumulative social cost of numerous small frauds
is substantial.
The purpose of an award of punitive damages
is not to compensate the plaintiff, but to express society’s
condemnation of certain kinds of conduct, and to deter the defendant
and others from engaging in similar conduct in the future. Individuals
who commit minor frauds against insurance companies face little
risk of punishment through the criminal justice system. Unless
insurers are prepared to pursue these claims in civil courts,
there is little to deter unscrupulous individuals from submitting
fraudulent claims.
Even if insurers are prepared to commit resources
to civil suits against fraudulent claimants, an action to recover
the amount paid out under the claim provides little or no deterrence.
The defendant may be able to avoid payment of the judgment,
but even if the insurer is able to collect, a judgment restricted
to the amount paid out on the claim is the equivalent of a loan
from the insurance company to the fraudulent claimant at a very
favourable interest rate.
The willingness of courts in British Columbia and Alberta to
award substantial punitive damages provides the insurance industry
with an opportunity to address the problem of fraud in a serious
way. The prospect of punitive damages is a real disincentive
to the dishonest claimant. Historically, insurers have been
reluctant to take action against fraud; to do so, a company
must be prepared to commit resources both to the investigation
of doubtful claims in order to marshal evidence of fraud, and
to the pursuit of civil remedies through the court system. As
the defendants are often impecunious, and are always unscrupulous
people who can be expected to evade service of court papers,
give false testimony, and avoid collection efforts, this is
often perceived as throwing good money after bad. If the industry
is to take advantage of the opportunity presented by the B.C.
and Alberta decisions, however, companies will have to commit
themselves to the pursuit of punitive damages, knowing that
the amount actually recovered will often fall short of the expenditures
required.
The principles set out in the B.C. and Alberta
decisions are in accordance with established law on the issue
of punitive damages. The decisions show that the civil justice
system can address a serious problem in our society, and it
is to be hoped that they will be followed by courts in other
Canadian jurisdictions.
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